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In the present case the complaint failed to allege that the deceased
was engaged in diving at the time of his death. As a result the complainant has been deprived of his trial on the merits. It is certainly
questionable whether the pleadings, in this instance, have been "construed so as to do substantial justice."' 9
BRuNa C. Emus

TORTS: THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE DOCTRINE
Crutchfield v. Adams, 152 So. 2d 808 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1963)
Plaintiffs, father and son, brought suit for injuries sustained by the
three-year-old son whose hand was caught in an unguarded revolving
fan belt of pump machinery located on defendants' residential premises. The trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss. On appeal, HELD, the allegations of the plaintiffs were sufficient to state a
cause of action under the attractive nuisance doctrine. Judgment reversed and remanded, one judge dissenting. Certiorari was denied by
the Florida Supreme Court without opinion.'
It was a fundamental principle of the common law that, unless
there was some special circumstance or condition, the owner or possessor of land owed no duty to a trespasser to maintain his property in
a safe condition.2 The one special circumstance that came to be recognized was the duty owed by the possessor to trespassing children.
The realization that a child is incapable of understanding and appreciating all the possible dangers that he may encounter in trespassing led to the formulation of the "attractive nuisance" doctrine.3

19. FA. R.Civ. P. 1.8(g).

1. Adams v. Crutchfield, 155 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1963).
2. See Prosser, Trespassing Children, 47 CALIw. L. REV. 427 (1959).
3. Thossm, TORTS §76, at 438-45 (2d ed. 1955).
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In 1873, in Sioux City & Pacific R.R. v. Stout,4 a railroad was
held liable for injuries received by trespassing children while playing
on a turntable on defendant's premises. This Supreme Court decision
marked the initial appearance of the attractive nuisance doctrine in
this country. The reception accorded the doctrine by the courts of the
several states has varied.5 Some accepted it wholeheartedly, 6 others
grudgingly and within narrow limitations, and a few totally rejected it.
The best available statement of the doctrine, as it stands today, is
found in the Restatement of Torts.7 Section 339 of the Restatement
declares essentially that a possessor of land is liable for injury to trespassing children caused by a structure or other artificial condition on
the land, if the possessor knows or should know that:
(1)
(2)
serious
(3)

children are likely to trespass on the land;
such condition creates an unreasonable risk of death or
injury to children;
the children because of their youth do not realize the risk

involved; and
(4) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition is
slight as compared to the risk.
The doctrine has generally been applied to such instrumentalities as
electricity, 8 dynamite caps,9 and turntables."0 It has also been applied to other conditions such as burning rubbish, 1 artificial bodies
of water,' 2 and sand bins.13 In Clover Creamery Co. v. Diehl,14

pump machinery similar to that in Crutchfield v. Adams was held to
be an attractive nuisance.
4. 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).
5. See 2 HAuPEr & JAmS, TORTS §27.5, at 1448 (1956); PRossER, TORTS
§76, at 489 (2d ed. 1955).
6. Florida has accepted the doctrine. See, e.g., May v. Simmons, 104 Fla.
707, 140 So. 780 (1932); Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 380 (1925).

7.

REsTATmuENT, TORTS

§339 (1934).

Florida courts have cited this section

of the Restatement with approval in numerous cases. See, e.g., Cockerham v.
R. E. Vaughan, Inc., 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955); Banks v. Mason, 132 So. 2d 219
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961); Fouraker v. Mullis, 120 So. 2d 808 (1st D.C.A. Fla.

1960).
8. Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So. 330 (1925).
9. Verran v. Town of Greeneville, 4 Tenn. App. 422 (1927).
10. Thompson v. Reading Co., 343 Pa. 585, 23 A.2d 729 (1942); Louisville &
N.R.R. v. Vaughn, 292 Ky. 120, 166 S.W.2d 43 (1942).
11. Tucker Bros., Inc. v. Menard, 90 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1956).
12. Banker v. McLaughlin, 146 Tex. 434, 208 S.W.2d 843 (1948); Franks v.
Southern Cotton Oil Co., 78 S.C. 10, 58 S.E. 960 (1907).
13. Ramsay v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., 295 IM. 395, 129 N.E. 127 (1920).
14. 183 Ala. 429, 63 So. 196 (1913).
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The principal significance of the Crutchfield case is the willingness
of the court to allow a homeowner to be held liable on the basis of the
attractive nuisance doctrine for injuries suffered by a young child who
has intruded on his residential premises. Although the Florida courts
have never expressly exempted homeowners from liability under the
doctrine, there has been no reported Florida case holding an owner
or possessor of land liable, on the basis of this doctrine, when the child
has trespassed on residential premises.
Many defendants in attractive nuisance suits have been business
entities engaged in construction work. This is easily understandable
since construction sites are areas into which young children are likely
to intrude. 15 Municipal corporations and various business organizations have also been held liable for harm to trespassing children on
the basis of this doctrine. In Adler v. Copeland'6 and Banks v. Ma-

son,'7 children drowned while trespassing on the residential premises
of the defendants. The defendant homeowners were excused from
liability on the basis that normal swimming pools are not attractive
nuisances; the court did not discuss the homeowner status of the defendants. The effect of these decisions has been to deny recovery
under the attractive nuisance doctrine except in situations involving
either "government" or "business."
An examination of cases in other jurisdictions shows that imposition of liability on homeowners on the basis of the doctrine is rare. In
King v. Lennen,' 8 the California Supreme Court held the defendant
homeowner liable for the drowning of a small child in a swimming
pool on the defendant's residential premises. The swimming pool was
held to be an attractive nuisance, but the California court, like the
Florida courts, did not discuss the homeowner status of the defendant.
A possible explanation of the lack of cases holding homeowners
liable is that most children injured on residential premises enjoy the
status of a licensee. The reluctance of the courts to impose liability
in these cases could also be founded on the feeling that the property
rights and privacy of the homeowner must be accorded the greatest
protection. The Restatement makes no distinction between a homeowner and other landowners; the duty imposed by the doctrine is on
the "possessor" of the land.
Factors that would tend toward imposition of liability include the
advent of homeowner insurance, crowded suburban living, and the
15. Carter v. Livesay Window Co., 73 So. 2d 411, 414 (Fla. 1954). "[I]t is
common knowledge that children are as prone to play around houses under construction as monkeys are prone to climb trees."
16. 105 So. 2d 594 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).

17. 132 So. 2d 219 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961).
18. 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98 (1959).
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de-emphasis of land as the indicia of wealth. Also, technical advances
and a high standard of living have made available to the homeowner
many new instrumentalities that are potentially dangerous to children.
These factors probably played a part in the court's adoption in Crutchfield of Prosser's view that the person who may protect the child with
the least inconvenience is the one upon whose land he strays."9
The courts attempt to strike a balance between the interests of the
landowner and the child, but the greater social interest in the safety
of young children is coming to be recognized. The decision in this
case is consistent with the Restatement view that the doctrine is an
independent rule of negligence liability that raises the question of
what a reasonably prudent man would do to protect trespassing chil20
dren.
The dissenting opinion in the Crutchfield case illustrates the difficulties caused by the perplexing manner in which the Florida courts
have applied the attractive nuisance doctrine to artificial bodies of
water. The Florida Supreme Court, in Allen v. William P. McDonald
Corp.,21 while holding that the attractive nuisance doctrine applied
to an artificial pond with sloping banks of white sand, laid down the
general proposition that the doctrine was inapplicable to artificial
bodies of water unless they presented a concealed danger in the nature
of a "trap" uncommon to natural ponds and streams. The Allen case
was later cited by the Third District Court of Appeal in Adler v. Copeland22 as authority for its holding that the attractive nuisance doctrine, as a matter of law, does not apply to a normal swimming pool.
The distinction between a normal swimming pool and an artificial
pond with white sand banks is not realistic when applied to a young
child who does not realize the danger involved. The fact that a condition giving rise to injury is common in character should not necessarily exclude liability. The ability to appreciate danger varies with
the age and mental capacity of the child. A normal swimming pool
may be an attractive nuisance to a child of two or three but not to a
child of ten or twelve. The important point is not whether the condition is common in character, but whether its dangers are fully understood by the child.
The pool cases typify the practice that has evolved of categorizing
conditions as attractive nuisances on the basis of whether they are "in19.
20.
21.
22.
2d 219
rail, or

PnossEn, ToRTs §76, at 438 (2d ed. 1955).
Prosser, Trespassing Children,47 CALIF. L. REV. 427, 466 (1959).
42 So. 2d 706 (Fla. 1949).
105 So. 2d 594 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958). See also Banks v. Mason, 132 So.
(2d D.C.A. Fla. 1961) in which a swimming pool without a fence, guard,
safety device was held not to be an attractive nuisance.
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herently dangerous" in the judgment of the court.23 The court in the
present case did not make this determination, and perhaps this marks
a desirable trend away from the classification approach. These cases
should not, and need not, be resolved by adherence to an inflexible
rule of law. Cockerham v. I. E. Vaughan, Inc.,2 4 decided by the
Florida Supreme Court in 1955, provides ample authority for allowing
a jury to decide whether the condition created a probable risk of serious harm not obvious or apparent to the young child. The flexibility
inherent in the jury approach should be utilized in all attractive nuisance cases including those involving artificial bodies of water. 25
Only by considering all the circumstances such as the age of the child,
the location and nature of the structure or condition, the utility of
maintaining the condition, and the precautions taken by the defendant, can a just result be reached in these cases.
M. J. MENGE

23. E.g., May v. Simmons, 104 Fla. 707, 140 So. 780 (1932), holding an endless belt used to convey sawdust from railway cars to defendant's ice plant was an
"inherently dangerous instrumentality"; Stark v. Holtzclaw, 90 Fla. 207, 105 So.
380 (1925), holding electricity to be an invisible force "highly dangerous to life
and property"; Edwards v. Maule Indus., Inc., 147 So. 2d 5 (3d D.C.A. Fla.
1962), holding that a sand pile did not present an inherent danger; Miller v.
Guernsey Constr. Co., 112 So. 2d 55 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1959), holding that an unfinished building in the orderly process of construction was not inherently dangerous per se.
24. 82 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 1955).
25. King v. Lennen, 53 Cal. 2d 340, 348 P.2d 98 (1959), held that whether a
normal swimming pool constituted an attractive nuisance was a question for the
jury.
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